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L OW RATES of inflation and unemployment have
not occurred simultaneously in this country for a num-
ber of years. Each successive administration has been
committed to take actions to achieve this objective
since the Employment Act of 1946, The currcnt Ad-
ministration’s programs to lower the inflation and un-
employment rates have run the gamut from basically
laissez faire policies to the unprecedented use of
peacetime price and wage controls. Achievement of
the two goals has been hampered by inherited price
pressures on the one hand and adverse labor market
developments on the other.
The tools available to any administration for the
attainment of these two economic goals include ag-
gregate budget (demand management) actions, and
structural price and employment measures. In addi-
tion, fiscal authorities indirectly influence monetary
actions through changes in the budget deficit or
surplus.
The case for vigorous manipnlation of these policy
tools should not be overstated. Most analysts recognize
the potential of price and wage controls, for example,
to harm, rather than benefit, economic society. Also,
the single-niinded pursuit of, say, lower unemployment
rates through stimulative demand management poli-
cies will result in some temporary gains in employ-
ment, but, in addition, may generate advancing price
pressures. In the past, such stimulative policies have
been typically reversed to curb inflation, with an
important side effect having been a rise in unemploy-
ment. This particular scenario of events occurred
most recently in the period from the mid-1960s to
the early 1970s.
This article reviews the national plans to curb un-
employment and inflation, as such plans are identified
in annual budget and economic report documents.
Programs found in the most recent annual reports are
stressed, but earlier policies are also discussed in order
to gain perspective in surveying the current Adminis-
tration’s plans. Plans — and actions — suggest that im-
aginative structural price programs have been
employed in recent years in an attempt to hold infla-
tionary pressures in check, while stimulative fiscal and
monetary actions have been taken to lower unemploy-
ment. The danger is that because of their apparent
“success” when unemployment has been high, vig-
orous inflation controls may be inappropriately called
for during a period of excess demand.
\JF:MPI)YMENT~INFLATION ISSUES
Presumably, the actions taken to attack unemploy-
ment and price problems are buttressed by plausible
theories. Before reviewing such actions, it is useful to
consider briefly some standard views of the sources of
unemployment and inflation.
(!nernpioyment
Once an individual becomes unemployed, the un-
derlying cause of his inability to find an acceptable
job at once is the cost of obtaining information on all
alternative employment possibilities. There are three
basic sources of the initial period of measured unem-
ployment: unemployment which arises from everyday
frictions in the labor market, unemployment due to
structural factors, and unemployment which arises
from unanticipated declines in the growth rate of
aggregate demand.’
Sfruct.a.ra.t and }rwhonal tJnem;.Ioymeat During
any given period there will be substantial changes in
the demand for and supply of workers in particular
industries. These structural demand and supply shifts
lead to short-run changes in employment. Individuals
adjust by changing their wage demands or by moving
to other employment opportunities. For example, a siz-
able cutback in defense spending, accompanied by an
increase in educational outlays, could lead workers in
the aircraft industry to accept wage cuts, or learn a
new skill, perhaps in the educational field. The transi-
tion period into the new field is often accompanied
by temporary unemployment.
Similarly, short-mn changes in employment levels
occur svith such normal frictional activity as workers
leaving jobs to seck better opportunities, occasional
business failures, work stoppages, and the irregular
entry of new workers into the labor force. The unem-
ployment which arises because of structural and fric-
tional factors would, for the most part, occur regard-
less of the posture of monetary and aggregate fiscal
stabilization actions.
See Roger W. Spencer, “high Employment Without Inflation:
On the Attainment of Admirable Goals,” this Review (Sep-
temimber 1971), pp. 12-26.
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Aggregate Demand - Relat.ed Unemployment
Monetary and aggregatefiscal actions affect aggregate
demand and thus influence the extent of unemploy-
ment arising from unanticipated changes in aggregate
demand growth. Stimulative policy actions are fol-
lowed by an increase in the demand for output and
labor services. This increased demand is reflected in
wages increasing at a more rapid rate than antici-
pated, on average, and a temporary lowering of the
unemployment rate.
When policy actions become restrictive, the demand
for output and labor falls. Employers curb the growth
of employment, while the supply of labor continues
to increase. The result is a temporary rise in the
unemployment rate.
Unusually large and continuous cutbacks in aggre-
gate demand are capable of increasing unemployment
sharply and for extended periods of time, as in the
l930s. Exceptionally stimulative aggregate demand
actions can drive unemployment very low for con-
siderable periods of time, as in the late l960s. High
unemployment rates were accompanied by price de-
clines for much of the l930s, and low unemployment
rates were associated with price accelerations in the
late 1960s.
“Nornzal” Unemployment — As mentioned earlier,
the underlying cause of an unemployed workers’ in-
ability to immediately find and take an acceptable job
is the absence of costless job information and mobility.
An unemployed individual could obtain employment
if he were aware of all feasible alternative job op-
portunities and wage rates, and had the resources to
act on such opportunities. So long as he had a skill
commanding some positive wage rate, and was not
barred by law or custom from offering his labor serv-
ices, he would be able to obtain employment. How-
ever, high costs of obtaining job information and
relocation do exist. Moreover, there is widespread
non-price job discrimination.
Artificial curbs on the supply of labor tend to ag-
gravate unemployment. For example, if a firm or labor
group decides to permit only left-handed individuals
to join their work force, job search lime and costs to
right-handed workers will be higher than otherwise.
Many employment fields ranging from medicine to
real estate either require licensing or restrict the
number of entrants in some manner. A similar ability
to control the number of apprentices is retained by
many labor unions. Other institutional factors influenc-
ing job search time include minimum wage legislation,
which adversely affects the employment opportunities
of teenagers and other inexperienced workers, and the
prevailing state of the communication and transporta-
tion networks.
When all these job market “imperfections,” are
taken into consideration, there is sonic “natural” or
“normal” rate of unemployment which is largely inde-
pendent of prevailing aggregate demand conditions.2
This level of unemployment consists of the unemploy-
ment engendered by structural and frictional forces.
Aggregate demand is such that prices and wages are
changing as anticipated, on average, and neither
workers nor firms are misled by excessively stimulative
or restrictive policy actions.
Structural measures to mitigate the adverse employ-
ment effects of licensing, union monopoly, and mini-
mum wage restrictions could be appropriately used to
lower the normal rate of unemployment. Manpower
programs and job banks, which rapidly disseminate
employment information, may also be of use in reduc-
ing structural and frictional unemployment. However,
only stabilization policy actions have the capacity to
both create and eliminate aggregate demand-related
unemployment.
Inflation
The underlying cause of inflation typically is ex-
cessive aggregate demand relative to the capacity for
producing goods and services. Historically, inflation
has occurred not only during the period of excessive
aggregate demand, hut for sonic time afterwards as
well. This pattern of inflation was observed over the
1965-72 period. Excessively stimulative monetary and
fiscal actions from 1965 to 1969 resulted in accelerat-
ing inflation. When stabilization policy actions became
restrictive in the late l960s in order to curb the
rapidly advancing prices, an early reaction of business
firms was to slow employment and output growth,
and only later to curb price increases. The initial
phase of an inflationary build-up, in this case the
period from 1965 to about 1969, is often called
“demand-pull”, and the latter period, from 1970 to
1972, is called the “cost-push” phase.
~See Milton Friedman, “The Role of Monetary Policy,” the
American Economic Review (March 1968), p. 9. “To avoid
misunderstanding, let me emphasize that by using the term
‘natural’ rate of uneniployment, I do not mean to suggest
that it is immutable and unchangeable. On the contrary,
many of the market characteristics that determine its level
are man-made and policy-made. hn the United States, for
example, legal minimum wage rates, the Walsh-Healy and
Davis-Bacon Acts, and the strength of labor unions all make
the natural rate of unemployment higher than it would
otherwise be.”
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The demand-pull concept of inflation is often asso-
ciated with excessive aggregate demand policies and
the cost-push concept is frequently associated with
“monopolistic” wage and price-setting powers of labor
unions and business finns. However, the view of cost-
push inflation described above holds that this phe-
nomenon exists as a lagged consequence of earlier
excessive aggregate demand,
independent Cost-Push —Can cost-push inflation
occur except as a consequence of earlier stimulative
monetary and fiscal policy actions? It is possible that
the price level could be forced up by restrictive prac-
tices of business and labor monopoly power inde-
pendent of stabilization policy actions. However, with-
out sustained rapid increases in the money stock, an
enduring general inflation is not likely to occur. If the
prices of some products were boosted in the absence
of an increase in aggregate demand, price rises would
likely result for only a short period as consumers
adjusted their budgets toward the purchase of other
competing goods.a
Supply reductions also affect the inflation rate. A
reduction in the supply of an important commodity
for which there are few, if any, good substitutes would
have a greater effect on price increases than for a
commodity with many good substitutes.4 Efforts to
increase the supply of a critical commodity by lower-
ing import barriers, or stimulating greater domestic
output, could speed the period of adjustment.
If, somehow, the prices of all currently-produced
goods could be increased in the absence of a rise in
aggregate demand, the “inflation” would last only as
long as it took wealth holders to discover that the real
‘Similarly, control programs may hold down prices of some
directly controlled products, but prices of uncontrolled items,
such as agricultural commodities in the Phase II 1972 experi-
ence, may rise. This point was cogently made in a recent
Wall Street Journal column. dollars created are likely
to be spent somewhere. If consumers have $10 and sellers
offer five widgets and five gidgets, the widgets and gidgets
can go for $1 each. If suddenly consumers have $12 and
the stores still have the same five widgets and five gidgets,
the price is likely to go up to $1.20.
“So along comes some flammurabi and says he will stone
to death anyone who buys or sells a widget for more than $1.
So consumers can only spend $5 for the five widgets. But
this leaves them with $7 to spend on the five gidgets.
Hammurabi is shocked to find that the price of gidgets soars
to the unheard-of-height of $1.40.” See “How to Control
Inflation,” Wall Street Journal, Jan. 10, 1973, p. 14.
4
Armen A. Alchian and William R. Allen, University Eco-
nomics 3rd ed. (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing
Company, Inc., 1972), p. 683, give an example of how a
change in the physical stock of goods can generate price
increases. “in a predominantly agricultural society, if the
annual harvest is unusually small, prices of goods will be
higher than usual. A historically significant case occurred
during The Black Death in England in the fourteenth
century.”
value of their cash balances had declined, and that
their spending rate should be reduced commensur-
ately. In this ease, the income velocity — or rate of
turnover — of the money stock would have increased
during the realization period, but would later return
to its trend rate. A one-time only rise in the level of
prices — but no continuing increase — would occur.
Only increases in aggregate demand, whose variance
around a trend is significantly influenced by monetary
changes, could permit the inflation to continue for an
extended period of time (assuming output is unaf-
fected by these changes in nominal magnitudes).
Basic Points — Two basic points of this analysis are
that (1) significant, lasting progress against inflation
can be achieved only by avoiding excessive demand
pressures, and (2) gains in the inflation battle can
possibly be obtained by structural attacks on business-
labor monopoly influence through programs which in-
crease the supply of goods and services. Any program
based solely on direct price-wage restraints which ig-
nores the effects of rising aggregate demand, may
achieve some initial success in treating the symptoms
of inflation. Over time, however, evidence from this
country and others suggests that moderate stabiliza-
tion actions alone can effectively combat inflation.5
IJnernploymen.t and Inflation
Unemployment and inflation are both affected by
aggregate demand policy actions and structural
changes. These influences are captured by a curve
relating unemployment and prices, often called the
Phillips curve. The Phillips curve is typically thought
to reveal that high rates of unemployment are asso-
ciated with low rates of price changes and low rates
of unemployment are associated with rapid rates of
‘The 1970 Report of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA
Report) notes that “Experience with such policies [direct
price-wage measuresl in other countries has been renmarkably
consistent. In some cases success in holding down wage
settlements or price increases has been achieved in particular
industries. There is usually a period in which these programs
may have some overall deterrent effect, though evidence
here is less certain. After an interval, however, there is a
point at which accumulating pressures make the programs
ineffective.”
‘American experience conformed to this pattern’ (pp.
23-24).
The same conclusion ‘vas reached by two analysts who
conducted an extensive survey of the European experience.
They found that”... periods of apparent effectiveness ‘vere
typically short-lived; they were frequently followed by wage
or price explosions which sometimes blew up the policies
themselves. Thus the policy at best seems to have been
gaited for a short sprint rather than a long race, which
suggests that it was better suited to deal with short-mn
emergencies like transient balance-of-payments disequilibria
than with persistent inflationary forces,” Lloyd Ulman and
Robert J. Flanagan, Wage Restraints: A Study of Income




Page 4FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
price advance. As the experience of the 1970-72 pe-
riod indicates, there are times when high rates of
unemployment co-exist with high rates of change of
prices.
Periods representing all three of these price-unem-
ployment combinations are found in Chart I. Instead
of the usual “rounded L” relationship the Phillips
curve is presumed to reflect, the picture which
emerges from a twenty-year plotting of price changes
and unemployment rates in the United States looks
more like a series of triangles, possibly depicting three
stages in the business cycle. The triangles may be
divided very roughly into periods of early recovery,
full recovery, and recession.
In the early recovery period, the rate of increase of
prices tends to drop sharply and the unemployment
rate falls.°Stimulative policy actions foster increased
aggregate demand and declines in unemployment.
Continued gains in aggregate demand result in de-
mand-pull inflationary pressures as the economy
moves into the full recovery zone. Movement into the
full recovery zone is characterized, in general, by
minor gains in lowering the unemployment rate and a
marked pick-up in the inflation rate.
Stimulative stabilization policies are reversed to
curb the rapidly advancing prices and a recession
ensues. The recession is marked by a sharp rise in
unemployment and some progress in reducing infla-
tionary pressures. As indicated by Chart I, the dura-
tion of each stage is highly variable.
Is the Phillips relation, or business cycle triangle,
inevitable? There is a view, which has received con-
siderable theoretical support, which answers “No.”
The “no Phillips curve” theory argues that if aggre-
gate demand policies were followed over a long pe-
riod that permitted prices and wages to change at
some steady, fully anticipated rate, unemployment
would eventually settle at its normal (or natural) rate
and not be associated with any particular rate of
change of prices. If inflation is “fully and instantane-
ously discounted, the Phillips curve becomes a vertical
line over the point of ‘equilibrium unemployment.’ “~
Effective structural unemployment and price policies
could be used to shift the Phillips curve — whether in
the form of a rounded L, a triangle, or a verticle line
more complete Phillips curve scenario is given in Roger
Spencer, “The Relation Between Prices and Employment:
Two Views,” this Review (March 1969), pp. 15-21.
7
Hcnry C. Wallich, “The American Council of Economic
Advisers and the German Sachverstaendigenrat: A Study in
the Economics of Advice,” The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics (August 1968), p. 356.
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Stop-and-go aggregate demand policies have prob-
ably hampered the attainment of time no trade-off state
envisioned by proponents of the long-run vertical line
view. In addition, these policies have affected the
timing involved in the price-unemployment move-
ments around the triangle. The intensity of a particu-
lar aggregate demand policy action and the length of
the period over which it is applied influence the ob-
served reaction lag of unemployment and prices. Thus
the recession, early recovery, and full recovery stages
should not be expected to begin at the same unem-
ployment-price combinations.
Also of considerable importance to unemployment-
price movements is the level of the normal rate of
unemployment. The nonnal rate is variable and
moves with changes in the structure of the labor
market, If stimulative aggregate demand policy ac-
tions were undertaken \vith an existing 5 percent
unemployment rate when the normal unemployment
rate was 5 percent, more inflation would result than
if the normal rate were 4 percent (given other com-
parable initial conditions). Thus, to achieve unem-
ployment and price goals, policymakers should recog-
nize both the lags associated with aggregate demand
policies and the state of the labor market, particularly
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— regardless of the propriety of aggregate demand
policies.
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At the current timne (early 1973) it appears from
Chart I that the re-entry into the full recovery stage
(as suggested by the unemployment-price projections
of most private forecasters) of the present business
cycle will occur at a rate of price increase far exceed-
ing that of earlier comparable periods. The highest
previous rate of price increase at the full recovery
threshold was between 1 and 2 percent in the mid-
lBfiOs. Excessively stimulative aggregate demand poli-
cies at this stage would propel the economy toward
the next phase in the cycle at rates of price increase
yet above those of the late 1960s.
A Swnminp 01t
This brief description of some of the prevailing
views of price-unemployment issues provides a back-
ground for surveying the national economic plans. In
light of the above, three considerations emerge in the
formulation of a national plan to deal with unem-
ployment and inflation.
First, there is the appropriate use of aggregate de-
mand policies which affect both unemployment and
inflation. The national plans should demonstrate an
awareness at this time of the “re-entry” problems en-
countered as the economy moves from the early re-
covery to the full recovery stage of the business cycle.
Since stop-and-go aggregate demand policies are often
recognized as having necessitated the re-entry itself,
consideration also should be given to the long-run
effect of current policies.
Second, structural employment programs should at-
tempt to reduce the costs of information associated
with job search, Such programs might provide in-
formation directly or do so indirectly by losvering
artificial employment barriers. Outlays for direct em-
ployment assistance, such as manpower training pro-
grams and job banks, are, of course, subject to
diminishing marginal returns.
Third, the inherent limitations of structural pro-
grams to curb inflation must also be recognized. Con-
trol programs may have some temporarily beneficial
effect on prices, but no basic supply and denmand
factors are influenced. Policies designed to increase
the supply of goods and services, such as the relaxa-
tion of import controls and crop acreage allotments,
would likely provide more lasting benefit.
NATIONAL SOLUTIONS TO
UITEMPLOYMIITJT-INFLSTION ISSUES
The national plans which are intended to result in
early achievement of low rates of unemployment and
inflation may be divided, for purposes of analysis, into
aggregate demand policies and structural programs.
These tools are examined as they relate, first to unem-
ployment alone, next to inflation, and finally to both
unemployment and inflation.
(Tne@npioicsne.ut Programs
Changes in the size and composition of the labor
force in recent years may have contributed to the
relatively high unemployment rates of the early l970s.
Even when aggregate demand policies stimulate total
employment, little progress can be expected in low-
ering the unemployment rate if the civilian labor
force also increases at a rapid pace. Moreover, the
aggregate unemployment rate is adversely affected if
the costs of job information are particularly high for
large segments of the labor force seeking employment.
In the first year and a half following the 1969-70
recession, civilian employment increased at a 2.5 per-
cent annual rate, but the civilian labor force rose at a
2,3 percent rate (compared to a 1950-70 trend rate of
1.4 percent). As a result, the unemployment rate re-
mained at about the 6 percent level. The labor force
increases were a consequence of large increases in the
total population of labor force age, and of significant
changes in labor force participation rates.
There is considerable evidence that the present
Administration recognizes the impact of the changing
structure of the labor market; however, attempts to
alleviate structural and frictional unemployment
through sweeping, innovative programs — such as
those of the early and mid-1960s— have not been
undertaken. (One reason for this may be the ineffi-
ciencies alleged in some of these earlier programs.)
Ample evidence of the awareness of the problem
can be found in the CEA Reports. The 1970 Report
discusses the progress and value of the Job Bank
Program, which makes available computerized lists of
available jobs svith the objective of lowering the costs
of information.
Ways should he sought to reduce this cost (of
‘frictional’ unemployment], without losing the at-
tendant benefits. For example, information plays a
crucial role in the process of satisfactorily matching
workers with jobs. Providing job information may be
a worthwhile social investment, decreasing the time
and effort workers must typically spend in search of
suitable employment and improving labor utilization.
The Department of Labor has long played a leading
role in gathering and disseminating job market in-
formation, and this Admninistration is accelerating
the developmncnt and introduction of systems ~uch as
the Job Bank and experiments in computerized
matching of workers with jobs.S
~197O CEA Report, p. 149.
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The 1970 CEA Report also makes reference to early lOGOs. Chart II (p. 8), which traces the ratio of
changes in the Job Corps and the Manpower Training civilian employment to population of labor force age,
programs designed to improve their efficiency of op- indicates that this ratio was high in the 1970-72 period
eration.° Decentralized administration is euphasized, relative to the earlier recession-recovery periods. Ci-
in particular. Neither the Job Bank, Job Corps, nor the vilian employment has increased at a rapid pace re-
Manpower Training concepts were originated by the cently, relative to the earlier periods, considering the
current Administration, movements in population of labor force age.
The 1971 CEA Report briefly described the Ad- Growth in the number of teenagers accounts for
ministration’s increase in budget outlays for manpower much of the increase in the population of labor force
training programs.1°The 1972 CEA Report devoted age in the 1962-72 period. Teenagers relative to the
considerable attention to the demographic-geographic total population of labor force age increased from 4.6
structural unemployment problems. The structure of percent in 1961 to 6.3 percent in 1972. Moreover,
the labor force with regard to women, teenagers, Viet- their labor force participation rate rose from 47 per-
nam veterans, and the individual states is discussed, cent to 52 percent over the same period. High costs
A brief digression on some of these structural prob- of job informnation (owing to inexperience, institu-
lems is appropriate at this point. tional and legal constraints) and a lack of mobility
keep teenage unemployment rates above those of
Raccut Structural Shifts in the Lahac Market —- The other labor force age groups. For example, if a teen-
accompanying annual rate of change triangle gives ager were able to locate employment (either above
rates of change in the population of labor force age or below the minimum wage) in another town, there
(16-64 years). Largely because of an increasing birth would be many constraints on his ability to move
rate in the 1946-57 period, the population of labor there.
force age rose much more rapidly in the latest reces-
sion and early recovery years (1970-72) than in com- Another group whose participation rate has in-
parable recession-recovery periods of the 1950s and creased rapidly in recent years is females. The parti-
cipation rate of women in the labor force rose from
~lbid., pp. 63, 65. 38.1 percent in 1961 to 43.9 percent in 1972. The
101971 CEA Report, p. 90. labor force participation rate of men over the same
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period fell from 82.9 percent to 79 percent. As a
proportion of all unemployed individuals, women’s
unemployment rose from 36.4 percent to 45.6 percent.
Changes in the structure of the labor market over
the past few years also occurred due to changing de-
fense policies. With a declining manpower commit-
ment to Vietnam since 1968, the civilian labor force
has had to absorb thousands of veterans, many with
only defense-oriented job skills. At first, the veterans’
unemployment rate remained well above that of their
civilian counterparts, but recently the two rates have
about coincided.
Cutbacks in defense expenditures also influenced
significanfly the geographic distribution of the unem-
ployed. In 1971 the unemployment rate varied from
3.3 percent in Colorado to 11.1 percent in the state of
Washington. Employment in Washington, Califoruia,
and several other states \vas adversely affected by the
reduction in outlays for defense and aerospace pro-
grams.
AU these structural shifts in the demand for and
supplies of labor may have resulted in a rise in the
normal unemployment rate in the late l960s and early
197Os. No conclusive evidence is available on move-
ments of the normal unemployment rate, but if it has
indeed increased in recent years, extensive use of
structural unemployment measures would be appro-
priate to attain a low aggregate unemployment rate
without incurring increased inflationary pressures.
Recent Struct:ural. ErrWtcflrUrs.EUrU t .tr.:~ra~~- De-
fense-related employment was cited in most CEA
Reports, but in less detail than in the 1972 Report
which described the formation of several new
programs.
Project Transition, the Jobsfor Veterans Committee,
and, to a lesser extent, the Public Employment Pro-
gram were designed to aid job-seeking veterans.’1
The new Technology Mobilization and Reemployment
program was created to mitigate structural unemploy-
ment among engineers, scientists and technicians fos-
tered by defense cutbacks.12
An analysis of the age-sex employment problems
presented in the 1972 CEA Report (p. 115) indicated
that using 1956 age-sex rates, an unemployment rate
of 4.1 percent in 1956 was equivalent to a 4.5 percent
rate in 1971. That is, changes in the composition of the
labor force due primarily to more young people and
more women in 1971 than 1956 resulted in an almost
one-half percentage point increase in the unemploy -
ment rate, other things equal.
The Administration urged a lower minimum wage
for teenagers as a partial solution to structural unem-
ployment. Such a proposal was submitted to Congress
in April 1973. As for women, their unemployment situ-
ation is described in detail in “The Economic Role of
Women,” a full chapter in the 1973 CEA Report. The
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, liberal-
ized child care tax deductions, and a requirement for
certain Federal contractors to provide equal employ-
ment opportunities for women are among the solutions
cited.
The Administration’s 1973 employment programs
which have received the most publicity are summar-
ized in the 1974 budget message. Along with a pro-
posal to consolidate a number of existing employment
assistance programs through Special Revenue Sharing,
the 1974 budget calls for an end to the Emergency
Employment Assistance Program. Although outlays for
some employment programs, such as “Work Incen-
tives”, are projected to rise in 1974, the net effect of
111972 CEA Report, p. 109. The proposal of Manpower
Revenne Sharing is also described (p. 111)
‘2lbid., p. 110.
Total Civilian Employment as a Percent of Civilian Non-Institutional Population (l6-64)~
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the elimination of Emergency Employment Assistance
and other changes is a budgeted decline in employ-
ment expenditures from $3.9 billion in 1973 to $3.3
billion in 1974. This would be the largest year-to-year
cutback in manpower programs since their inception
in 1963 (see Table I).
The move towards consolidation and efficiency is
more characteristic of the current Administration’s
efforts in the manpower area than is innovation. The
major manpower legislation, in terms of dollar outlays
or individuals affected, was enacted in the 1962-68
period.13 A seminal piece of legislation, the Man-
power Development and Training Act of 1962, re-
quired the Administration to prepare a full report on
manpower activities each year. Thus, manpower pro-
grams have been in existence long enough for some
tentative evaluations to be made.
Effectiveness of the Employment Progranw — Many
studies of the employment assistance programs have
reported favorable results. However, these studies have
usually not been marked by cost-benefit analysis.
At the elementary level of assessment, it is possible
to obtain figures for the number of jobs filled by in-
dividual programs. For example, the 1972 CEA Re-
port indicated that direct efforts to find jobs for mii-
tary veterans resulted in 320,000 job placements
between June and October 1971; the Emergency
“A current listing and brief description of the major Federal
work-training programs enacted in the 1962-71 period is
given in Sylvia S. Small, “Statistical Effect of Work-Train-
ing Programs on the Unemployment Rate, “ Monthly Labor
Review (September 1972), pp. 8-9.
Employment Act of 1971 was responsible for provid-
ing over 75,000 jobs with state and local governments
by the end of 1971.’~
In terms of the unemployment rate, one study
found existing work-training programs in 1971 were
responsible for the unemployment rate being 5.9 per-
cent rather than 6.2 percent.’5 A similar employment
contribution was attributed to the work-training pro-
grams for the 1965-67 period.’6
These studies cannot say, of course, that the alloca-
tion of $X billion to lower the unemployment rate by
Y percent resulted in a net increase in welfare. There
is at least one study which attempts to determine,
without going into welfare or utility analysis, the dol-
lar increase in GNP ensuing from dollar outlays in
manpower programs. C. C. Holt and his co-authors
estimated that a $14 billion expansion in such pro-
grams would result in a $30 billion rise in gross na-
tional product.’7 Moreover, they estimated that, with
the same level of inflation that would correspond to
a 4.5 percent unemployment rate in 1972, the $14
billion expansion of manpower programs would lower
unemployment by 2.4 percentage points to the 2.1
percent level.
Robert E. Hall, in a far less optimistic article, put
the reduction in unemployment due to the major ex-
pansion of manpower programs at only 0.4 percent
that is, a fall from 4.5 percent to 4.1 percent.’8
By making the simplistic assumption that changes in
GNP are comparable to those in employment, Hall’s
estimate of a lowering of the unemployment rate by
one-sixth of Holt et al. ( ~ ) would translate into
a GNP gain of only $5 billion vs. a $14 billion cost.
141972 CEA Report, pp. 109-110,
15
Sylvia Small, “Work-Training Programs,” p. 12.
16
Malcolm S. Cohen, “The Direct Effects of Federal Man-
power Programs in Reducing Unemployment, The Journal
of Human Resources (Fall 1969), pp. 491-507. Cohen
found that the programs led to a reduction in the unem-
ploysnent rate of 0.4 percent in 1967 (from 4.2 to 3.8), 0.3
percent in 1966, and 0.15 percent in 1965.
‘
7
C. C. Holt, C. D, MacRae, S. 0. Schweitzer, and R, E. Smith,
“Manpower Proposals for Phase III,” Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity (3: 1971), p. 717.
15
Robert E. Hall, “Prospects for Shifting the Phillips Curve
through Manpower Policy,” Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity (3: 1971), p. 673. Hall and bit et al., found the
occupational mobility, vocational counseling and teenage
work study, and employment service expansion programs to
be of the most benefit in lowering the unemployment rate.
As Hall points out, there is probably some double counting
in the bit et al. estimates in going from the micro to the
macro implications of the programs. A more realistic estimate
would probably be somewhere between the Hall-Bolt et al
findings.
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Despite these widely varying assessments, there is
little doubt that, at some positive cost, the unemploy-
ment rate could be lowered through a major expan-
sion of manpower programs. A potentially more effi-
cient way to lower the unemployment rate through
structural measures would be through the elimination
of artificial barriers to employment, such as the mini-
mum wage and non-price job discriminatory prac-
tices. Current research also suggests that government
programs, such as unemployment compensation,
which tend to reduce the incentive for job search are
responsible for some unemployment)5
Price Programs
The initial efforts of the current Administration to
curb inflationary pressures are recorded in the 1970
CEA Report. Only aggregate demand tools were used,
rather than direct price-wage measures because “the
results of our own experience and numerous trials of
such policies in other countries over the preceding 20
years did not justify confidence that such efforts
would help the inflation problem in l969.”20 The siz-
able deficits and rapid monetary expansion of the
several preceding years had led to a classic case of
demand-pull inflation.
The 1971 CEA Report reflects some initial interest
in structural price policies. Actions were taken to in-
crease the supply of lumber and oil (the latter by
easing restrictions on importation and production), in
order to slow the advance of prices in these particular
industries. Copper pricing policies were investigated
and the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy
probed into economic conditions in the steel industry.
Construction workers and employers were invited to
submit plans which would lead to a slowing of wages
and prices in the building sector.
Attempts were also made to improve the function-
ing of markets generally, as well as in the specific
cases cited. The Council of Economic Advisers pre-
pared periodic “Inflation Alerts” to “‘spotlight the sig-
nificant areas of wage and price increases and objec-
tively analyze their impact on the price level.’ “21 A
‘°SeeMartin S. Feldstein, “Policies to Lower the Pennanent
Rate of Unemployment,” in United States Congress, Joint
Economic Committee, Reducing Unemployment to 2 Per
Cent, October 17, 1972, p. 27, Feidstein argues that the
disincentive effects of the unemployment compensation sys-
tem have increased the duration of unemployment in the
United States. Moreover, “It is also noteworthy that when
the British introduced earnings related unemployment bene-
fits in 1966. their unemployment increased substantially and
the previous relation between unemployment and vacancies
broke down.’
201970 CEA Report, p. 23.
211971 CEA Report, p. 63.
National Commission on Productivity was appointed
to recommend measures which would increase pro-
ductivity in various sectors of the economy.
The Federal Government’s tendency to aggravate
inflationary pressures in important areas was also rec-
ognized. The Regulations and Purchasing Review
Board was established to review such problem areas
as “. ..import restrictions, regulations which unduly
increase the cost of bidding on small Government
projects, design and procurement methods for Gov-
ernment buildings and the administration of the Davis-
Bacon Act, which requires that contractors on Federal
construction projects pay ‘prevailing’ wages (a pro-
vision which in practice may have exerted an infla-
tionary effect on construction wage rates and eosts).”22
Taken as a whole, these were admirable programs
to improve the functioning of the market system, some
of which, if given time, could have contributed sig-
nificantly to the slowing in the inflation rate which had
begun by 1970. Given the duration and intensity of
the inflation build-up prior to the moderately restric-
tive stabilization actions of 1969, there was no reason
to expect a sharp downturn in the rate of price ad-
vance in the early 1970s. However, the progress in the
inflation battle was not sufficient by August 1971 to
satisfy the Administration, and sweeping price and
wage controls were instituted at that time.
The controls program, announced August 15, 1971,
was established under the authority of the Economic
Stabilization Act of 1970.23 As described in the 1972
CEA Report, the initial step in the program was “an
immediate 90-day freeze on prices, rents, wages, and
salariesand creation of a Cabinet-level Cost of Living
Council (CLC) to administer the freeze and to ad-
vise on further stabilization policies and actions.”24
At the end of the 90-day freeze (or Phase I), a
complex program of controls, supervised at the top
level by the Cost of Living Council, was set in motion.
The two principal elements of the new administrative
machinery were the Price Commission, to which the
Rent Advisory Board reported, and the Pay Board, to
which the Executive Compensation Sub-Committee
reported. Other new parts of the machinery were the
Committee on Interest and Dividends, the Committee
on Health Services Industry, the Committee on State
and Local Government Cooperation, and the Agricul-
22lbid,, p. 81.
23
The same act ~va,sthe basis for the construction industry
program established in March 1971 and administered by the
Construction Industry Stabilization Committee.
241972 CEA Report, p. 75.
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ture Stabilization and Conservation Service. The Na-
tional Commission on Productivity and the Construc-
tion Industry Stabilization Committee (CISC) were
retained in the new frameworkY~
The Phase I and II control programs were, ac-
cording to the 1973 CEA Report, a success. “Judged
by any expectations one could derive from history,
either in the United States or abroad, the system was
successful.”26 The CEA does not attempt, however, to
claim more for controls than is warranted by the data.
They note that it is possible to observe that the rate of
increase of prices was falling before the institution of
controls, and the continued progress in the Phase I
and II periods cannot be attributed wholly to their
effects.27 For example, the quarterly fixed weight gross
private product price index accelerated from a 4.1
percent rise for the year ending fourth quarter 1968
to a 5.1 percent increase in the following year. It then
decelerated smoothly to 4.5 percent, 3.8 percent, and
~3 percent in the years ending 1970, 1971, and 1972,
respectively.28
The admission of uncertainty about the extent of
the effectiveness of controls on inflation is followed by
the CEA’s declaration of belief that the risk of price
acceleration was substantially reduced. Even this mild
claim ignores the possibility that controls may have
only altered the observed inflation lag pattern, such
that the acceleration of prices was simply post~poned.
The risk of a delayed acceleration was increased if
prices were artificially restrained in the face of stimu-
lative aggregate demand policy actions.
Despite the “successes>’ of Phase I and Phase II,
much of the controls mechanism was altered in Phase
III. Why? For very good reasons, as discussed in the
1973 CEA Report. The CEA notes that the costs of
controls in terms of distortions and interferences with
production and distribution, as well as administrative
costs, were not great in the 1971-72 period, but they
were growing.
They [the costs of controls] could be much more
significant in 1973 as the program aged and as the
economy came closer to its potential. The number of
instances of excess demand would multiply, and the
relative price ceilings established by the system
would become more potent sources of distortions.
More and more companies would hit their profit-
margin ceilings, with adverse consequences for cost
control and for investment incentives. More insist-
ence on formal and equitable procedures would arise,
litigation would multiply, and administrative costs,
public and private, would increase greatly. Less tol-
erances of the inevitable delays and red tape of the
system would be forthcoming.20
Under Phase III, “voluntary” price-wage guidelines
were kept, but the administrators of the guidelines,
the Price Commission and Pay Board, were relieved
from service. The CISC and the Committee on Inter-
est and Dividends were retained.
Supervisory authority is maintained by the Cost of
Living Council. Mandatory controls remain on food
processing and distribution, and the construction and
health industries. Recently, ceilings on meat prices
were imposed.
In addition to the recent price control activity, a
number of steps have been taken to increase the sup-
ply of certain goods. These actions include suspension
for 1973 of wheat acreage allotments, disposal of some
Government-owned stocks of grains, and suspension
for 1973 of all import controls on meat in order to get
food prices down. Import controls on oil are also being
relaxed. Similar actions to remove artificial restric-
tions on the supply of other goods and services would
likely result in a slowing of price advances in many
areas.
Two recent studies on one of these artificial supply
restrictions — import controls — suggest that such con-
trols are costing American consumers billions of dol-
lars a year. Stephen Magee found that the total costs
to the United States of existing tariff and quota bar-
riers — both here and abroad — run between $7.5 and
$10.5 billion annually,30 Andrew F. Brimmer con-
cluded that sugar quotas may cost American consum-
ers as much as $300 to $500 million per year, man-
made fiber and woolen textiles quotas $300 million,
and petroleum quotas $5 billion.3’ In general, Mr.
Brimmer found that “. ..in categories in which foreign
competition was restricted because of quota limita-
tions, prices rose more rapidly than in categories where
imports were free to expand.”32
251973 CEA Report, pp. 69-70.
30
Stephen P. Magee, ‘The Welfare Effects of Restrictions on
U.S. Trade,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (3:
1972).
3
lAndrew F. Brimmer, “Imports and Economic WeLfare in the
United States” (a speech to the Foreign Policy Association,





Considerably more detail is available on the Phase I and
Phase II programs in the 1972 and 1973 CEA Reports.
261973 CEA Report, p. 51.
2iIbjd., pp. 60-62.
25
The CEA also notes that although several econometric
studies indicate controls lowered the rate of price advance
beyond what would have otherwise occurred, the poor
record of this technique in predicting the rate of inflation
prior to controls does not inspire confidence in their answer,
and evidence from thi
5
source must be regarded as inconclu-
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Given time, the repeal of legislation designed to
benefit certain groups through insuring their monop-
oly powers would likely result in substantial gains in
the effort to slow price advances, Some efforts made
in this direction prior to August 1971 were overridden
by the desire to show more immediate progress in
curbing inflation. The public at large indicated a de-
sire for faster progress in 1971 and a strict controls
program was eventually adopted. General displeasure
with a possible pick-up in the inflation rate in 1973
could be interpreted by some to indicate a “need”
to return to such programs. Indeed, this seems already
to have happened in the case of meat price ceilings.
irte Demand Programs
Aggregate demand programs are reflected in an
administration’s overall budget. The unified budget
messages prepared by the current Administration dur-
ing the past few years have consistently been overly
optimistic in terms of holding down the magnitude of
the deficits.33 There is nothing unusual about this, but
some of the errors have been quite large, so that more
stimulus may have been imparted to the economy
than originally intended. For example, the first esti-
mate for the fiscal year 1971 unified budget was a
$1.3 billion surplus; the realized budget showed a $23
billion deficit. Adoption of the high-employment
budget principle for fiscal years 1972 and 1973 pro-
vided no guarantee of realized budget targets.34
The large deficits of recent years have created diffi-
culties for monetary authorities, Because of the inter-
vention in the Government securities market to re-
sist rising interest rates, monetary aggregates, such as
the money stock, have probably increased at rates
more rapid than desired. In fact, monetary growth
accelerated each year from 4.3 percent in 1969 to 7.4
percent in 1972.
The large deficits and rapid monetary expansion in
the recent past have helped bring the unemployment
rate down from 6 percent to the 5 percent level more
rapidly than otherwise would have occurred, but may
also have laid the groundwork for demand-pull price
pressures. Further strong monetary and fiscal stimulus
could induce unemployment to continue to fall,but at
~
3
Partially because of the unexpected influence of tax over-
withholding, the deficit for fiscal year 1973 projected in the
1972 budget message may be met.
~For these two years, the sum of the error for the high-
employment budget, as calculated by this Bank, is expected
to be about $7 billion on the deficit side. On a national
income accounts basis, the Federal budget deficit has in-
creased each fiscal year from $1.3 billion in 1970 to an
estimated $26.6 billion in 1973. See 1973 CEA Report,
p. 271.
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some point in the vicinity of the normal unemploy-
ment rate, price pressures begin to accelerate.
This, of course, is the problem of re-entry into the
zone of full recovery — a zone in which smaller and
smaller gains in employment are achieved only at the
cost of accelerating inflation. Much of the theme of
the latest budget message reflects concern for the
proper re-entry into the full recovery stage.
During the past 2 years, with the economy operat-
ing below capacity and the threat of inflation reced-
ing, the Federal budget provided fiscal stimulus that
moved the economy toward full employment. The
1974 budget recognizes the Federal Government’s
continuing obligation to help create and maintain —
through sound monetary and fiscal policies — the
conditions in which the national economy will pros-
per and new job opportunities will be developed.
However, instead of operating primarily as a stimu-
lus, the budget must now guard against inflation.36
Despite the obvious recognition of the re-entry
problem, there are a number of factors working
against the realization of another year or more of
receding inflationary pressures. First, Government ex-
penditures remain difficult to control. Many items in
the budget, such as interest payments on the national
debt, are outside the scope of year-to-year budget
decisions. Also, it is the responsibility of Congress to
actually make the necessary appropriations, a task
usually approached in piece-meal fashion. The re-
sult often has been actual Federal expenditures in
excess of those projected by any Administration’s ini-
tial budget, despite periodic fund impounding.
Second, the acceleration of consumer prices to a 3.9
percent rate in the second half of 1972 from a 2.9
percent increase in the preceding year, in the face of
Phase II controls, suggests the bottom of the slowing
in price rises may already have been reached. The
similar acceleration of wholesale prices in the second
half of 1972 and into early 1973 provides additional
evidence that re-entry into the full recovery zone,
with the usual implications for inflation, is occurring.36
The true underlying price situation is clouded be-
cause of adverse short-run agricultural supply factors,
the absence of adequate information on the current
normal rate of unemployment, and the influence of
:msThe Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year
1974 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1973), p. 4.
36
lncreases in the wholesale prices of agricultural commodities
accounted for much of the wholesale price acceleration in
the second half of 1972. Consumer food prices in early 1973
probably reflect movements of these wholesale prices. More-
over, the recent devaluation of the dollar will tend to in-
crease prices of imported itenis, thereby resulting in a rise
in the consumer price index, which includes a number of
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controls on price indexes. Just as the moral suasion of
recent months made the “prime” interest rate a poor
indicator of true market pressure at times, so too have
the various price indexes possibly been emitting mis-
leading signals.
A third factor encouraging skepticism of the possi-
bility that inflationary pressures will taper off in the
near future isthe rapid growth of the money stock and
large Government deficits that occurred throughout
much of 1972. A deficit of $18.2 billion in the second
half of calendar year 1972 (national income accounts
basis) and a 7.8 percent rate of increase of the money
stock over that period have not yet fully worked
through the economy. The rate of growth of the pri-
vately held money stock has slowed in early 1973.
However, the lags associated with earlier rapid mone-
tary growth continue to influence current economic
activity.
The Administration recognizes the view that stop-
and-go policies are not inevitable. In several instances,
long-run considerations are reflected in budget and
CEA documents. The 1972 CEA Report included a
discussion of the long-run characteristics of the un-
employment-inflation problem. An entire chapter of
the 1972 Report focused on the long-run outlook of
resource needs for the various sectors over a five-year
period. The 1974 budget message presented, for the
first time, a detailed report of the following year’s
budget picture.
All the recorded long-run emphasis, however, has
not necessarily been reflected in policy actions over
the past few years. A desire to reduce unemployment
in the face of rapid labor force growth has probably
been the principal factor underlying the ever-acceler-
ating expansionary actions in the 1969-72 period. Had
it not been for adverse demographic and geographic
influences on the structure of the labor force and em-
ployment during this time, aggregate demand policy
actions might have been more in keeping with long-
run price stability.
SUMMARY
High rates of unemployment and price advances
have persisted in the U.S. economy the past few years
despite, or perhaps because of, the use of a wide
variety of corrective actions. Given a basically stable
economy, the use of a succession of stop-and-go poli-
cies to attain short-run goals is more the source of,
than the solution to, many longer-run economic
problems.
The experience of other recession and early-recov-
ery periods indicates that the temporary simultaneous
occurrence of considerable unemployment and infla-
tionary pressures is not unusual. However, the current
inflation rate, as the economy nears the full recovery
stage, is well above that of earlier comparable periods.
Recent policy actions, as recorded in annual budget
and economic report documents, reflect considerable
innovation in the price control area. Structural em-
ployment policies have been marked primarily by
consolidation of earlier programs. Economic spokes-
men have repeatedly called for the lowering of artifi-
cial barriers to employment such as restrictions on
entry by various businesses or unions, outdated licens-
ing requirements, and minimum wage laws. As yet,
no vigorous, concerted effort has been forthcoming.37
Sweeping price policies were adopted in the form
of the Phase I, II and III control programs. Precisely
how much these programs lowered the rate of increase
of measured price indexes is unknown. Moreover, the
true inflation rate may have been masked by controls.
Expansionary monetary and fiscal actions in the 1970-
72 period have speeded employment gains, but may
also have set the stage for renewed inflationary
pressures.
The budgeted ceiling on Federal expenditures, if
attained, could be accompanied by more moderate
fiscal and monetary stimulus. A slowing in the growth
rates of some monetary aggregates has already oc-
curred in the early months of 1973. If aggregate
demand policies of moderation are either “too little or
too late,” calls for renewed, economy-wide price con-
trols may well be heeded because of their apparent
‘<success” in a period of slack demand. Experience in
this country, as well as in other countries, indicates
that vigorous controls cannot succeed under conditions
of strong excess demand.
37
See Arthur F. Burns, The Problem of Inflation, an American
Economic Association address, December 29, 1972. Mr. Burns
lists a number of specific structural employment measures
and concludes “There is no quick or easy path to meaning-
ful structural reform. But I see no real alternative if our
national aspiration for prosperity without inflation is to be
realized, while free enterprise and individual choice are
being preserved.” (pp. 21-22)
/
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